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Influence of Transnational Economic Alliances on the IFRS 
Convergence Decision in India – Institutional Perspectives 
 
 
Highlights 
 Decision-making for IFRS convergence within nation states significantly 
influenced by traditional trade and economic alliances. 
 Influences exerted through transnational policy networks between 
institutional fields 
 Impact of influences determined by power balance between local and 
transnational actors embedded in different institutional fields. 
 Indirect effect of US delays in IFRS convergence on India as a result of 
cross country economic ties. 
Abstract 
This study contributes to the literature on global governance by highlighting the 
importance of not losing sight of the nation state as an important player in the 
transnational governance arena. Specifically, literature on global (accounting) 
regulation devotes a great deal of attention to the roles of organisations and agencies 
with transnational remit (such as global standard setters, donor agencies) while 
often downplaying the significant impacts of the more traditional cross- country 
links forged through economic relationships and resource dependencies between 
national and transnational institutional fields. This was specially noted in the case 
of the indirect influences of the US’s decision to delay IFRS convergence. While 
being interpreted as an indirect source of influence, such a decision played a very 
significant role on the convergence negotiations in India. The study shows how the 
US influence was channelled through Japan with which India has significant trade 
and economic relations and, most importantly, holds a joint forum specifically to 
discuss convergence issues. The consequences of India’s links with countries such 
as US and Japan in the decision-making process provide a vivid indication of the 
important roles of cross-governmental relationships in the global governance arena, 
and also question the position of transnational organisations as pervasive powers in 
such governance. The study’s findings clearly demonstrate that the pursuit of full 
IFRS convergence strongly favoured by the transnational forces was invariably 
challenged in the Indian context by the influences of powerful nation states 
advocating a more cautious approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Regardless of severe criticisms on its international applicability, IFRS has been 
adopted fully or partially by approximately 120 countries (Sharma, Joshi & Kansal, 
2017). Countries such as Japan, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand are yet to 
finalise their convergence decisions. Although India committed itself to achieve 
IFRS convergence by 2011, the convergence decision-making process has been 
marked by much public political debate with the consequence that despite two 
further deadlines being announced by the state, the process had suffered severe 
delay. The official stance of the state in favour of convergence had been 
contradicted in practice by repeated failures to translate this policy into action. This 
paper aims to explore the influence of India’s trade and economic alliances in 
delaying its convergence decision. The study uses concepts of transnational policy 
networks, resource dependencies and institutional theory to analyse this context. 
 
Analysing the convergence decisions of countries undertaking accounting reforms 
in the light of significant trade and economic alliances, especially with powerful 
countries such as the US and Japan, reveals additional dynamics of divergence 
between rationales and reasons cited by nation-states in making such decisions 
(Ramanna & Sletten, 2009). Such analysis adds to our understanding of the 
relationship between power, resource dependency and institutional forces that 
shape the accounting regulatory arena (Crawford, Ferguson, Helliar & Power, 
2014; Bengtsson, 2011). The significance of trade and economic alliances in 
shaping convergence decisions have been previously explored in developed 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, European Union (EU) and Canada 
(Nobes & Parker, 2010; Zeff & Nobes, 2010; Ramanna, 2012; Andersson, Haslam, 
Tsitsianis, Katechos, & Hoinaru, 2016). However, studies exploring the influences 
of such alliances in shaping convergence decisions in developing countries are 
limited (Mir & Rahman, 2005). Since a large number of countries that have 
converged with IFRS are developing countries (IFRS, 2017), exploring the role of 
these influences on convergence decisions in these countries would  add to our 
understanding of the on-going accounting convergence drive and the different 
outcomes of such convergence (Weaver & Woods ,2015; Ghio & Verona, 2015; 
Sharma, Joshi & Kansal, 2017). 
 
India is one of the largest developing economies in the world; sixth largest in terms 
of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and third largest in terms of purchasing 
power parity (World Bank, 2017). Recently the World Bank (WB) ranked India as 
the fastest growing economy in the world (World Bank, 2017). Having been 
classified as a major Newly Industrialised Country1 (NIC) by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and reported to be a transition economy by the WB (World 
Bank, 2013), the Indian socio-political and economic context often displays 
characteristics of both developed and developing countries (Boddin, 2016). Hence 
the findings of this paper are relevant to not just developing countries but could 
also be applicable to some extent in the context of developed countries. The 
decision-making process for IFRS convergence in India commenced with the state 
setting a deadline of 2011 to achieve convergence. This deadline was not met and 
                                                   
1 The term NIC is used for developing countries that have surpassed most other developing countries in economic 
growth but have not yet achieved the status of a developed country. 
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during the course of the next 5 years, two other deadlines of 2013 and 2015 were 
set which were also not met (Seth, 2016). A reliable news daily reported that Indian 
companies have started to implement the IFRS converged Indian accounting 
standards (Ind AS) from June 2016 onwards (Seth, 2016).The latest update on IFRS 
website2, regarding the convergence process in India as of July 2018, indicates that 
India has adopted the ‘substantially converged’ Ind AS and not officially adopted 
IFRS. 
 
The discrepancy between rhetorical policy and practice in India was to some extent 
explained by local resistance to immediate convergence mostly manifested in the 
form of industrial lobbying due to legislative and taxation issues. However, the role 
of transnational influences in the process remains to be fully explored. Research 
has shown how donor agencies and international financial institutions (IFIs) 
coercively seek to bring about standardisation, especially in developing countries. 
Literature suggests that substantial financial dependence on foreign aid from IFIs 
such as the WB implies that the state was no longer the sole orchestrator of reform 
policies (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2010). Financial dependence on IFIs meant that 
accountability, in terms of efficient use of resources, played an important role in 
donor-recipient relationships, to the extent that most developing countries were not 
left with much choice (Adhikari & Mellemvik, 2010; Mantzari, Sigalas & Hines, 
2017; Irvine, 2008; Neu, Ocampo, Garica & Zepeda, 2002; Mir & Rahman, 2005). 
 
In addition to the role of IFI’s, extant literature also provides some insights into 
issues such as the role of mimetic influences on countries in order to appear 
legitimate and comparable to ‘world leaders’ (Touron, 2005, pp. 886), socio- 
political influences on the development and convergence of IFRS (Chua & Taylor, 
2008) and the role of multiple socio-cultural and geo-political factors such as 
religion and colonial history (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007).Specifically, institutional 
perspectives such as decoupling have been used to analyse issues such as symbolic 
versus substantial adoption of IFRS (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007) as well as normative 
and mimetic sources of influences on convergence decisions such as auditors and 
industry counterparts of companies (Touron, 2005). These studies challenge the 
economic rationales cited by supporters of IFRS convergence and highlight the 
significant role of multiple actors such as regulatory authorities and MNCs in 
shaping the drive for convergence. They provide a strong analytical premise 
through different forms of institutional frameworks which could be applied to 
analyse significant geo-political alliances between nation-states. This study 
contributes to extant literature by identifying transnational influences through 
regional and trade alliances and analysing the role played by such influences in 
counter-balancing influences from IFIs and other transnational forums promoting 
convergence. 
 
Extant literature on the role of transnational influences channelled through 
traditional cross-country relations mainly focuses on developed countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand, UK, US and Europe (Nobes & Parker, 2010; Nobes, 2013; 
Hail, Luez & Wysocki, 2010; Zeff & Nobes, 2010). These studies while providing 
useful insights into the effect of such relations on accounting standards and 
practices, do not fully explore the decision-making process through which the 
                                                   
2 http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/india/ 
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influence of such cross-country trade and economic relations are translated into 
financial reporting decisions, especially in developing countries (Humphrey & 
Samsonova-Taddei, 2015). They do, however, discuss a wide variety of sources of 
influence on financial reporting practices such as inter-dependence between 
countries through political and economic relations, the role of state and mutual 
influences on legal systems (Nobes & Parker, 2010). However, these influences 
would differ in the way they manifest themselves in the context of IFRS 
convergence in developing countries (Samsonova, 2009; Ding, Jeanjean & 
Stolowy, 2007). Insights into the manifestations of these issues as carriers of cross-
country trade and economic relations in developing countries as part of a wider 
transnational policy network would provide deeper insights into the International 
Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) ongoing convergence movement. 
 
Extant literature on convergence rarely answers questions such as ‘how do the 
geopolitical trade and economic alliances between countries shape the national 
decision for IFRS convergence? One exception to this is a study conducted by 
Ramanna & Sletten, (2014) who found that trade and economic ties do play an 
important role in convergence decisions. The authors note, 
Consistent with the presence of network effects in IFRS adoption, we find that 
a country is more likely to adopt IFRS if its trade partners or countries within 
in its geographical region are IFRS adopters (pp. 2). 
 
The authors further highlight the need for studies that analyse the significance of 
trade and economic alliances on convergence decisions as necessary to comprehend 
the varying outcomes of IASB’s convergence drive. 
Analysis of the influence of such alliances on the decision-making process in this 
study is informed by an institutional analytical perspective focusing on the role of 
institutional fields that occupy and operate in the regulatory decision-making arena 
(Crawford et al., 2014; Arnold, 2005). Institutional fields have been considered 
appropriate platforms of analysis to explore the struggles and negotiations that 
occur between actors in a regulatory decision-making arena (Arnold, 2005). Djelic 
& Sahlin (2009) further emphasise the role of institutional forces in shaping power 
relations between actors involved in decision-making in accounting regulatory 
arenas. In this context, few studies call for ‘sophisticated conceptions of power’ 
(Crawford et al., 2014, pp.305) and highlight the need to refrain from analysing 
power relations between institutional fields through a pluralistic perspective based 
on success achieved by actors in influencing the decision (Cooper & Robson, 2006; 
Crawford et al., 2014). Furnari (2016) while discussing institutional changes makes 
the following observation, 
The vast majority of institutional studies have analyzed instances of 
institutional change within a single institutional field, devoting less 
systematic attention to the issue of how institutional change occurs 
between multiple institutional fields (pp.553). 
This paper draws on extant literature to analyse the influence of trade and economic 
ties channelled through multiple institutional fields between nation states on power 
dynamics in the accounting regulatory arena. It uses concepts of resource 
dependency and exchanges to analyse these power dynamics in the accounting 
regulatory arena. 
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The study contributes to the global governance scholarship by highlighting the 
importance of not losing sight of the nation state as an important player in the 
transnational governance arena. Specifically, literature on global (accounting) 
regulation devotes a great deal of attention to the roles of organisations and agencies 
with transnational remit (such as global standard setters, donor agencies) while 
often downplaying the significant impacts of the more traditional cross- country 
links forged through economic relationships and resource dependencies. This was 
specially noted in the case of the indirect influences of the US’s decision to delay 
IFRS convergence. Unraveling the means through which US’s decision affected 
India’s move towards convergence makes a significant contribution to our 
understanding of accounting policy decisions and its links to state policies on 
transnational economic alliances. It adds to literature addressing policy makers in 
accounting profession as well as state institutions that lead decision-making 
processes for convergence. While being interpreted as an indirect source of 
influence, such a decision played a very significant role on the convergence 
negotiations in India. The study shows how the US influence was channelled 
through Japan with which India has significant trade and economic relations and, 
most importantly, holds a joint forum specifically to discuss convergence issues. 
These negotiations were driven by policy makers operating from multiple 
institutional fields representing the accounting practice, the state, regulatory 
authorities and industry. Analysing these interactions and their impact on the 
decision-making process for convergence has provided insights into policy-making 
in accounting standardisation, evolution of national accounting practices as a result 
of institutional influences of geo-political alliances and contributes to scholarship 
on issues surrounding accounting convergence.    
The consequences of India’s links with countries such as US and Japan in the 
decision-making process provide a vivid indication of the important roles of cross-
governmental relationships in the global governance arena, and also question the 
position of transnational organisations as pervasive powers in such governance. The 
study’s findings clearly demonstrate that the pursuit of full IFRS convergence 
strongly favoured by the transnational forces was invariably challenged in the 
Indian context by the influences of powerful nation states advocating a more 
cautious approach. It emphasizes that the representation of the accounting 
standardisation drive as an independent and neutral power that harmonises 
accounting practices fails to convey the increasing influence of powerful nation 
states and the effect of geo-political alliances on the decision-making processes of 
convergence across the globe. While contributing to literature on decision-making 
on IFRS convergence, the findings of the study also address policy makers in 
standard setting organisations such as IASB as well as policy makers in accounting 
within developing countries. 
 
2. Notion of IFRS Convergence in India – Background 
In 1991 the government of India introduced several economic reforms in response 
to severe balance of payments crisis. Free market principles were adopted to attract 
international trade and create an open economy. This led to considerable dilution 
of state control over the economy leading to an increase in Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDIs). Over subsequent years the Indian economy witnessed a stable 
growth in the FDIs which led to investor demands for financial statements prepared 
according to IFRS. These investors were supported in their demands by some 
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Indian companies that were either entering into joint ventures with foreign 
companies or purchasing them. In 2007, the state and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India (ICAI) in response to these demands, made an announcement 
of IFRS convergence by 2011 (Jain, 2011). 
 
The ICAI initially supported full adoption but due to industrial lobbying decided 
along with the state to alter its stance to convergence with differences (CG2). A 
member from industry and professional bodies who was a participant in decision-
making groups stated, 
 
“The professional bodies in India were very interested in complete adoption 
of IFRS…. initially they virtually copied everything from IFRS. However, 
the industrial sector was seriously hit by IFRIC 15 that had a very different 
accounting treatment for real estate companies….  IFRIC 12 also affected 
many projects such as road transport projects, airport projects etc. through 
implications on direct and indirect taxes…so they objected...” (CG2). 
 
In its concept paper, the ICAI attempts to justify the differences between national 
accounting standards and IFRS by providing the following definition of 
convergence: 
 
“to design and maintain national accounting standards in a way 
that financial statements prepared in accordance with national 
accounting standards draw unreserved statement of compliance 
with IFRSs” (p.12). 
 
Despite significant carve-outs in newly framed Ind AS, the ICAI has been quite 
vocal in its claims of substantial convergence with the IFRS. Through its concept 
paper the ICAI identifies and discusses the key issues that shaped the decision to 
‘not adopt’ IFRS mainly due to locally embedded aspects (Kantayya, 2016; 
ICAI, 2015). These issues include: 
 
a) Maintaining consistence with legal and regulatory requirements - Some 
examples of national accounting standards which are formulated to suit the 
legal requirements are AS 21 Consolidated Financial Statements, AS 25 
Interim Financial Reporting and AS 31 Financial Instruments. In the case 
of AS 21, the definition of ‘control’ is based on requirements of 
Companies Act 1956 and hence is different from the definition provided 
in IAS 27 Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements. Similar 
differences based on legal requirements have been cited as examples in the 
case of the other two accounting standards as well (ICAI Concept Paper, 
2007). 
 
b) Economic factors related to the use of fair value - The key issue discussed 
under economic factors is the use of fair value approach by IFRS. The 
concept paper states that the markets in India do not possess the necessary 
dimensions to arrive at reliable fair values for various assets and liabilities 
(ICAI Concept Paper, 2007). This point has been validated by one of the 
interviewees from the industry: 
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“There is a dire need for developing professional elite services 
such as valuation. There should be valuation standards in India 
without which there will be no uniformity in the reports 
presented and fair value system will be a failure” (IB5). 
 
This indicated that the ICAI and the industry were all of the opinion that 
India was not prepared to successfully implement the fair value system.  
 
c) Inadequate level of preparedness of industry and conceptual differences 
such as requirement to create provisions at an early stage under IAS 373 
(ICAI, 2007). 
 
The decision-making process for IFRS convergence in India has been particularly 
intriguing due to controversial debates surrounding the issue as well as repeated 
failures to meet targets of roadmaps and deadlines etched out by the state and the 
ICAI. The enthusiasm for IFRS convergence displayed by the state and the ICAI at 
global forums was not translated into actual progress. The country was not able to 
meet the first deadline of 2011. The date set for convergence passed without any 
explanations or public notifications of delay. In 2012, an emphatic reiteration of the 
state’s intent to converge with IFRS by 2013 was conveyed through a statement 
made by the Minister for Corporate Affairs & Power at a seminar, 
 
“……we are determined to ensure that IFRS is implemented by 
April 1, 2013,” (Srivats, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, this second deadline was also evaded without any public 
announcements or explanations. Following the second deadline, the ICAI prepared 
a new roadmap for convergence in 2013 which proposed the implementation of Ind 
AS by listed and unlisted companies worth more than US$ 78515755 (approx.) 
starting from 1st April 2016. The roadmap proposed a deadline of 1st April 2018 for 
insurance, banking and non-banking finance companies (MCA, 2015). 
 
Debating the decision is not unusual amongst countries moving towards 
convergence. However, it is unusual for a country to repeatedly announce 
convergence deadlines followed by long periods of delays shrouded in mysterious 
silence from the state. It was found that industrial lobbying was a key local factor 
that led to the delays. Tax issues that could be addressed only through legislative 
amendments by the state formed the central theme of industry resistance. It should 
also be noted here that differences in the opinions of the ICAI and the IASB on 
issues discussed in the concept paper, mainly arising due to differences in the legal 
and economic environment of the country also acted as a significant channel of 
resistance to immediate convergence with IFRS (Kantayya, 2016; ICAI, 2015). 
  
                                                   
3 The recognition of provision has been pointed as a difference using the examples of AS 29 and IAS 37 Constructive Obligation. 
The requirements of IAS 37 stipulate the creation of provision on the basis of constructive obligation which would result in the 
recognition of provision at an early stage. The concept paper cites an example of restructuring of an enterprise where an early 
recognition of a provision would not be appropriate since a liability cannot be stated to be crystallised at such an early stage. The 
discussion of such conceptual differences in the paper reflects differences in the opinion of the ICAI with regard to the timing of 
recognising the provision and also the judgement of related determining factors. 
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Nonetheless, a deeper analysis of the Indian context suggests that transnational 
influences may have also existed in the form of regional and global trade alliances. 
Exploring the role of such alliances in causing repeated delays would contribute to 
a greater understanding of the nuances that shape national convergence decisions 
and the effect this has on associated countries and global standard setters. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This paper follows the theoretical strategy of broadly defining transnational policy 
networks and resource dependency in an attempt to capture as much of the 
institutional role of these networks and resource relations, as possible. 
3.1 Transnational Policy Networks: Institutional Fields of Regulatory Decision- 
Making 
 
Institutional dynamics of transnational regulatory networks and collaborations have 
been researched through multiple perspectives (Djelic & Sahlin-Anderrson, 2006; 
Djelic & Quack, 2010; Philips, Lawrence & Hardy, 2000). Transnational policy 
networks that drive regulatory decision-making processes are comprised of a 
variety of actors, both individual and institutional. However, a transnational 
network is not a formal construction, that is, the actors do not come together 
formally for the purpose of forming a network. These actors converge around a 
common issue regarding which a decision is being made (Hood, Baldwin & 
Rothstein, 2001; Suddaby, Cooper & Greenwood, 2007) while at the same time 
often having divergent views and opinions. So converging around particular policy 
issues provides such actors with opportunities to influence how such issues become 
eventually resolved. Hence, the motivation that drives these actors to interact with 
each other is to collectively exert influence on the decision. To influence a decision, 
actors often join forces and establish relations with other actors who favour similar 
policy opinions (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Samsonova, 2009; Djelic & 
Quack, 2010; Risse-Kappen, 1995). However, it would be misleading to think of 
transnational networks as homogenous environments. Difference of opinion 
between network participants is common.  
Affiliations to multiple institutional fields could be one of the reasons for such 
variances in opinions and interests of actors in transnational policy networks 
(Philips et.al. 2000; Risse-Kappen; 1995). An institutional field is defined as a 
social arena of actors belonging to a common institutionalised environment 
characterised by the dissemination, production and reproduction of institutional 
rules and resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Philips et.al. 2000). Actors 
converging around a policy decision in a transnational network predominantly draw 
upon ideas and priorities institutionalised in their domestic institutional fields 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1991; Philips et.al. 2000). Institutional fields of powerful 
countries in a transnational policy network appear to be more influential in terms 
of determining the outcome of discussions that take place in such networks (Hardy 
& Philips, 1998). The ongoing negotiations in decision-making often influences the 
institutional fields of less powerful nation-states in the network. Thus the decision-
making process within transnational policy networks are influenced by national 
institutional fields and vice-versa. 
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In the context of accounting regulatory decisions made by nation-states, some 
dominant institutional fields exist in the forms of domestic structures constituted of 
the state, society and polity (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Risse-Kappen (1995) while 
analysing the impact of transnational networks on foreign policies of the state, 
emphasised the significant role played by domestic structures. Differences in the 
domestic structure, that is, organisational interlinkages between the state, the 
society and the polity, have been stated to create variations in the impact of 
transnational actors (Meyer, 1990; Rochon, 1988). 
 
Institutional fields prevalent in a country could determine the accessibility of the 
national political system to transnational actors such as IFIs and the requirements 
for effective coalitions between actors to enable the successful exertion of influence 
on national decisions (Risse-Kappen, 1991; Katzenstein, 1976). This implies that 
the ability of transnational actors to access the national political system of a country 
could depend on the position of the state vis-a-vis other non- state actors in the 
country. An example of the significance of domestic institutional fields could be 
the differences in the decision-making process for IFRS convergence in India and 
Bangladesh (Ramanna, 2012). The contrasting policy impact of transnational actors 
in the two countries is reflected through the quick and non-controversial decision 
made by Bangladesh to go ahead with convergence under pressure from the WB 
(Mir & Rahman, 2005) while India had been going through controversial delays 
and debates in the decision-making process despite pressure from transnational 
actors (Srivats, 2012). This however, does not imply that India is absolutely 
independent of IFI’s. India’s resource dependencies on IFI’s are balanced by similar 
if not equally consequential resource dependencies on local non-state actors as well 
as other transnational regional actors whose stance on the convergence decision 
was different from that of the IFIs. 
3.2 Resource dependencies between institutional fields: Channels of power 
 
Decision-making shaped through power disparities arising out of resource 
dependencies between actors embedded in different institutional fields has been 
widely discussed in theoretical literature (Guo & Acar, 2005; Burt, 1983; Pfeffer & 
Salanick, 1978; Friedkin, 1986; Nolke, 2003; Risse, 2005; Djelic & Quack, 2010). 
Casciaro & Piskorski (2005) explored resource dependencies by incorporating the 
theoretical constructs of power imbalance and mutual dependence to the existing 
resource dependency theory in the context of inter- organisational dependence and 
relations. These ideas when combined with different levels of institutional 
influences on decision-making processes help examine transnational networks in 
the context of accounting regulation. Louma & Goodstein (1999) examine 
institutional influences on decision-making processes at three levels or fields: a) 
society including legislative influences b) industry level c) organisational level. In 
the context of this study, this framework is adapted and integrated with resource 
dependency ideas to explore domestic and transnational institutional fields that 
characterise the society, polity and trading and economic networks. This helps 
visualise the transnational policy network for convergence decision-making 
process as a network constituted of several institutional fields that are interrelated 
to each other through resource dependencies and exchanges. Differences in 
resource capacities of these institutional fields lead to power disparities (Philips 
et.al. 2000).  
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While extant literature on transnational regulatory regimes do focus on unequal 
power dynamics of actors in transnational policy networks (Djelic & Sahlin- 
Andersson, 2006; Mir &Rahman, 2005; Ramanna, 2012), such power inequities in 
  
the accounting regulatory context have not been widely researched through 
resource dependency perspectives (Casciori & Piskorski, 2005). Philips et.al (2000) 
notes that power dynamics define the significant role played by rule and resources 
of different institutional fields of actors in shaping decision-making processes on 
policies. Powerful actors belonging to resource rich institutional fields involved in 
transnational decision-making processes are able to favourably influence other 
participants in the network (Hardy &Philips, 1998). This paper focuses on 
exploring the role of resource dependencies or exchanges between institutional 
fields as channels of power in transnational regulatory network. 
 
Power imbalance between two actors is determined by the extent of mutual 
dependence between their respective institutional fields (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Guo & Acar, 2005; Philips et.al. 2005). This implies that the power equation 
between these actors or institutions would alter if there is a change in the mutual 
dependence over the course of time. It has often been observed that long- term 
alliances or relationships between national and global actors do change with 
changes in resource capacities of the socio-economic and political institutional 
fields of nation-states. For example, the donor-recipient relationship between India 
and the WB over the last two decades has witnessed a significant change with India 
graduating fully from WB’s International Development Association (IDA) 
assistance programme4 (IDA, 2016). This change in the extent of resource 
dependence could determine the extent of influence that the WB could exert on 
national decisions. While the powerful IFI was able to exert direct and dominating 
influence on the national accounting decision of relatively more financially 
dependent country such as Bangladesh (Mir & Rahman, 2005), it may not be 
possible for WB to exert similar influence in India due to the changing socio- 
economic developments which have altered the power equation between the two 
actors. It is important to examine these features while studying the decision- making 
process for convergence as they help to explain the source of influences on the 
decision and also explain the reasons for power imbalance between actors in the 
transnational arena (Risse- Kappen, 1995; Nolke, 2003). 
 
Since transnational networks facilitate group decision-making processes across 
national and transnational institutional fields (Nolke, 2003; Risse, 2005), these 
networks are often characterised by power disparities (Haslam, Tsitsianis, 
Anderrson & Yin, 2013). Two features of transnational policy networks that act as 
sources of power disparities in the decision-making arena are resource 
dependencies in relation to transnational agencies, and state/domestic institutional 
structures (Djelic & Quack, 2010; Nolke, 2003). The exchange of resources in 
transnational policy networks takes place through national and international 
institutions. These resources could be financial resources, information resources or 
technical aid for implementation of projects (Scholte, 2000; Keohane & Nye, 1989). 
                                                   
4 The IDA provides financial assistance to the world’s poorest countries. Countries graduating from IDA are those 
that have made significant developments in terms of per capita income, creditworthiness, economic and political 
progress and no longer receive substantial funds under this scheme (IDA, 2016). 
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Specifically, these features revolve around the donor-recipient relationship that 
exists between actors from different institutional fields in the decision- making 
arena. Resource dependencies between national and international institutions affect 
the on-going negotiations for terms of finalising the decision. 
 
This is because recipient actors are dependent on donor actors for resources and this 
places the latter in a relatively powerful position (Webb, 1991; Cooper, 1968). Such 
a relationship acquires significance due to its power dimension and has a significant 
impact on the decision-making process (Garret & Lange, 1995; Haggard & 
Maxfield, 1996). And it is these institutions that determine the political influence 
on the process. Hence resource interdependencies across institutional fields and 
distribution of political capacities among the actors also create power disparities 
that allows some actors to exert greater influence and significantly affect the 
decision-making process. Figure 1 presents a framework that combines the concepts 
of transnational policy networks constituted of actors from various institutional 
fields, resource dependencies and power disparities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1          Interconnected Institutional Fields of Transnational Regulatory 
                                                                   Networks 
 
While the role of power in financial reporting decisions made by companies has 
been explored (Mantzari et al, 2017), power disparities as sources of institutional 
influences on actors making financial reporting decisions within countries have not 
been as extensively researched. Often actors who succeed in exerting a greater 
extent of influence are those who occupy powerful positions within the socio- 
economic and political institutional fields of the decision-making arena. (Krasner, 
1995). Another important aspect is that the relatively less powerful actors do not 
concede easily to the influences of the more powerful actors; they respond to these 
influences and attempt to negotiate terms with other actors. It is interesting to 
contemplate on the reasons that lead certain communications to facilitate a desired 
change in policy in certain cases, but not in others. The different levels of social 
significance attached to different actors involved in the decision-making process 
could be cited as one of the reasons why all the actors do not enjoy the same level 
of power (Covaleski, Dirsmith & Rittenberg, 2003; Caramanis, 1996). In the 
standard-setting context of several countries, actors wielding greater power, such 
as corporate lobbyists, not only voice their opinions but are also successful in 
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getting their views translated into action (Georgiou, 2004). Since accounting 
regulation in the national context has often been observed to undergo a group 
decision-making process and has also been stated to have political and social 
characteristics (Ding et al, 2007; Fearnley & Hines, 2003), it becomes necessary to 
study the power perspective to gain a clear understanding of the decision-making 
process of national standard-setting and the rationale that drives the same.  
 
Thus the accounting regulatory sphere within the national decision-making context 
involves significant power plays across multiple institutional fields at both the 
national and transnational level, which strongly influences the actual 
implementation process (Mantzari et al, 2017). 
 
 
4. Research Methods 
 
Empirical evidence for this study was collected through interviews and analysis of 
archival data pertaining to a period of 8 years from 2005-2014. Significant 
information was gathered from discussions with 25 key actors involved in the 
decision-making process through interviews. Target groups and accessibility were 
the two main criteria that were used to finalise the list of interviewees. 
 
The process of data collection commenced with the mapping of key actors involved 
in the decision-making process. Identification of these actors was based on 
information gathered from personal contacts and secondary sources. Three 
members from industry who were also involved in public-private projects were 
personal contacts of the researcher. Being a part of public-private projects gave 
them access to senior government officials. At first, the researcher contacted these 
three members of industry via telephone and e-mails. Information provided by these 
contacts in addition to review of information available from online documentary 
sources such as reports of government organisations and professional bodies helped 
the researcher to further identify target groups. These target groups included 
members of professional bodies, IFIs and members of the core decision-making 
team for convergence led by the state. Contact with target interviewees was 
established through introductions provided by the first three interviewees. 
 
In conducting semi-structured interviews, the researcher prepared an interview 
guide based on a list of themes identified from extensive literature review and 
theoretical concepts such as institutional fields, transnational and local actors, types 
of resources and policy networks. The interview guide included questions that were 
drawn from these themes and secondary data collected as part of background study 
for interviews; though some questions were reordered or skipped as deemed 
appropriate in the given interview context (Saunders, Thornhill & Lewis, 2012). 
Open-ended questions were drafted so as to encourage varying levels and ranges of 
responses from the interviewees (Gillham, 2005). These questions were designed 
to draw out the experiences and stories in the interviewee’s own words, at his/her 
own speed and order (McCracken, 1988). However, ‘planned prompts’ were used 
in cases where the interview appeared to get stalled on a single issue or when the 
information being provided by interviewees was beyond the scope of this study. 
These interviews facilitated the discovery of sufficient details of the interviewee’s 
story within a reasonable timeframe. 
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Interviews conducted were mainly face-to-face but some interviews were 
conducted over telephone and Skype. Permission to record interviews was sought 
and all except senior government officials agreed to this request. Senior government 
officials cited regulations as the reason for not permitting to record the interviews. 
Data collected during discussions with these officials were manually transcribed 
soon after the interviews. 
 
 
A total of 6 interviews were conducted during the first round of interviews in July 
2012. These included interviews with members of the ICAI and industrial 
associations. The second round of interviews in April 2013 included discussions 
with 10 actors directly or indirectly with the decision-making process. All except 
one of these interviews were conducted with members of the government including 
4 representatives of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) and 5 representatives 
of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Several of these interviewees were re-contacted 
via telephone in May 2014 to corroborate information collected from documentary 
evidence as well as for new updates in the decision-making process. This also 
helped to bridge gaps that came up during analysis of data collected from the first 
and second rounds of interviews. The interviews used in this study as sources of 
information came from a cross-section of key actors of the decision-making arena 
occupying senior roles in the hierarchy of the organisations they represented. Table 
1 presents a brief introduction to the participatory roles of interviewees as well as 
codes used to identify the interviewees. 
 
Table 1 Identification/ Participatory Details of Interviewees 
 
 
The length of interviews and codes assigned to interviewees are provided in the 
appendix. 
 
4.1 Documentary Analysis 
 
A wide variety of documents were used to collect information as also to substantiate 
data gathered from interviews as shown in Table 2. A classification of the types and 
numbers of documents used in this study are presented in Appendix 2.
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Table 2 Documentary Analysis 
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A detailed comparative review of the various documentary sources discussed in 
Table 2 to confirm the accuracy of timelines for construction of events. For 
example, details regarding an event on convergence decision-making process 
published in newspapers were corroborated by collecting and reviewing 
documents obtained from the websites of actors/institutions mentioned in the 
newspaper. This information was further validated by interviewing concerned 
members of the said institution or organisation. Extensive documentary analysis 
had supplemented information gathered through interviews and in several cases 
documentary evidence was the main source of information in this study. 
 
 
4.2 Data Analysis 
 
The data collected was analysed and interpreted to examine the influence of trade 
and economic alliances on India’s decision to converge with IFRS. The decision- 
making process was studied through an analysis of key events or milestones that 
occurred in India regarding IFRS convergence. The events were then streamlined 
on a timeline to enable a greater understanding of the sequence of events and the 
impact that these events had on the decision. Codes derived from the theoretical 
framework and review of literature were used to analyse and interpret these events. 
These codes were allotted to the four aspects listed in Table 35. 
  
                                                   
5 Please see below 
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Table 3 Data Analysis Structure 
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5. Findings 
 
5.1 Institutional Fields of Transnational Influences 
The decision-making process of IFRS convergence in India was triggered way back 
in 2000 through indirect and ‘soft’ influences exerted on the state by actors from 
different transnational institutional fields such as the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO) Sydney Resolution (UNCTAD X, Conference Proceedings, 
2000). In 2001, India volunteered to participate in the Financial Sector Assessment 
Programme (FSAP) jointly conducted by the IMF and WB to assess the stability 
and resilience of financial systems in member countries (MOF Report, 2013). All 
these forums promoted IFRS convergence. 
 
Institutions such as the WB and IMF may be viewed as actors of developmental 
institutional fields at the transnational level. They interact with state and non-state 
actors embedded in political, economic and developmental institutional fields at the 
national level, working in public and private sectors as part of developmental 
projects. However, in the context of this study, the influence of such interactions 
extended into the accounting regulatory institutional fields and was not restricted 
to developmental institutional fields. 
 
In response to such influences, the Government of India (GOI) in 2001 established 
the National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards (NACAS) constituted 
of members from regulatory authorities, professional bodies and industrial 
associations. NACAS was also used as a platform to engage with expert opinions 
of all stakeholders since the accounting standards were now being framed in 
alignment with IFRS (ICAI Concept Paper, 2007). This is theoretically interpreted 
as change in the political/state institutional field at the national level in response to 
flow of influences from different trade and economic institutional fields at the 
transnational level. A government representative stated, 
 
“Government was now beginning to get serious….. we didn’t want to be left 
behind in the international scenario… we wanted our own experts to first 
validate these standards…and this was to some extent, the result of the 
gradually changing global scenario…” (MCA 3). 
 
All these interactions with actors from transnational institutional fields may be 
interpreted as having a normative influence on the government’s decision to 
constitute the NACAS. It must be noted, however, that the influence of these 
institutions was not coercive. A WB representative stated, 
 
“ We are not in any way pressurising India to adopt IFRS….the process 
(for convergence) seems to have been initiated in an attempt to follow 
global trends” (WB1). 
 
This view of the WB was also corroborated by members of the MCA and ICAI. Such 
interactions of the state operating from a domestic institutional field with global actors 
embedded in transnational institutional fields could be explained through normative and 
mimetic forces of institutionalism. The absence of coercive influences were expressly stated by 
interviewees. One representative of the MCA said, 
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“….all these international institutions accepted Indian GAAP at the time 
…they encouraged us to use IFRS …but were not in a position to force 
us” (MCA2). 
 
To some extent, this was validated by documentary evidence on, for example, 
reduction in the financial resource reliance of India on institutions such as the WB 
and IMF (World Bank Report, 2017). The diminished influence of IFIs was noted 
by a representative of the MCA, 
 
Institutions like the WB and IMF had significant influence in the pre- 
liberalisation phase in India. The growth of industry and the country’s 
increasing economic and political power in the Indian sub-continent resulted 
in a steady decrease of the influence of these institutions (MCA 3). 
 
The delays in the decision-making process also indicated that the state was in a 
position to resist global pressures to converge. 
 
A trade and economic alliance that played a part in adding momentum to the 
decision-making process was India’s trade relations with the EU. The EU is India’s 
largest trading partner6 as well as the largest source of its foreign direct investment 
(European Commission Report, 2017). The EU’s mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
2005 followed by European Securities and Market Authority’s (ESMA) 
communications with the state, Indian regulatory authorities and the ICAI led to the 
setting of 2011 as the deadline of IFRS convergence for Indian companies listed on 
EU stock exchanges7. This deadline triggered India’s preparations for a formal 
announcement of convergence. The formal announcement for IFRS convergence by 
2011 was made by the ICAI in 2007, and officially notified by the state in 2008 
(MCA Press Note, 2008). These initial phases of the decision-making process 
witnessed the flow of both direct and indirect institutional influences from 
transnational institutional fields. For example, while EU’s mandatory adoption of 
IFRS was an indirect source of influence, ESMA’s communications with the state 
and the ICAI were direct sources of influence. This could be interpreted as India 
being influenced by the convergence decision of a group of nation-states which is a 
significant trade partner and source of financial resources. The concurrence of the 
deadline set by the ESMA and the state adds impetus to this inference. This instance 
indicates that resource dependency relations between national and transnational 
institutional fields in the form of economic and trade alliances play a significant role 
in driving the decision-making process for convergence. The proceedings of the 
decision-making arena further demonstrate that the sources of such influences are 
not static and that they evolve with changing power dynamics not solely defined by 
financial resource dependency but also regional alliances between nation-states. 
 
                                                   
6 Trade with EU constitutes 13.5% of India’s overall trade with the world in 2015-16 making EU 
its largest trading partner. This constitutes 2.2% of EU’s overall trade with the world and ranks 
India as its 9th largest trading partner. EU exports to India increased from € 21.3 billion in 2005 to 
€ 37.8 billion in 2016 (EC, 2017). 
      7 During the period of 2003-2012, Indian companies have invested $56 billion in Europe. During 
        this time-period Indian companies financed 511 Greenfield projects and acquired interests in 411 
        companies. UK, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium are the four main countries attracting Indian  
        corporate investors. UK attracts the major share of investments with approx. 43%  
        of Indian corporate investments ($ 24 billion) followed by Germany ($ 6.9 billion). Major acquisitions  
        include Tata Motors $ 2.3 billion purchase of Jaguar and Land Rover and Tata Steel’s $13.3 billion  
        acquisition of Anglo-Dutch steel maker Corus (EICC Report, 2012). 
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In August 2009, the MCA set up a high powered group to discuss and resolve 
challenges faced in the IFRS convergence project (MCA Press Note, 2009). This 
‘Core Group’ was constituted of members of different stakeholder groups and was 
headed by the then Secretary of MCA. Some other significant transnational 
institutional fields that propelled the decision-making process were the US GAAP-
IFRS convergence project led by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and IASB, the SEC’ permission to file IFRS compliant statements and the G-20 
summit held in Pittsburgh in September 2009 as well as official convergence 
deadlines announced by countries such as Canada and China (ICAI Concept Paper, 
2007; MCA Press Note, 2010). 
 
So while India was not under coercion from transnational organisations, through its 
membership in various transnational institutional fields, it was in effect under 
indirect pressure to make a commitment towards full IFRS convergence. 
 
5.2 Resource Dependencies between Transnational Institutional Fields: India- 
Japan IFRS dialogue as a channel of impact of US delays 
 
The year 2010 also saw the inflow of influences from regional institutional fields 
of countries such as Japan into the decision-making arena of IFRS convergence in 
India. In 2010, a Joint Working Group consisting of members of the Core Group 
from India and the IFRS council of Japan was constituted, in addition to forming 
subgroups for joint training programmes and also for jointly representing issues to 
IASB (MCA Press Note, 2010). A member of the core group corroborated this 
information, 
 
“We (the government) are conducting joint sessions with the government 
of Japan….people from (professional) accounting bodies and some other 
regulatory authorities are also involved from both sides…” (CG5). 
 
Though both delegations were led by the state, actors from different institutional fields 
of both countries such as regulatory fields, industry and accounting profession were 
involved in the process. The Core group from India, led by the secretary of MCA was 
constituted of representatives from state bodies such as MoF and the Comptroller and 
Auditor General’s (CAG) office, regulatory authorities such as the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), National Stock 
Exchange of India Ltd (NSE) and pension and insurance regulators and professional 
bodies such as ICAI (MCA Press Note, 2010). However, the IFRS Council of Japan, 
in addition to these representatives, included representatives from the Japan Business 
Federation (JBF). India appears to have excluded members from industrial associations 
such as FICCI and CII while Japan included them for this dialogue. Although, a 
member from the Core group emphasised that the views of the industry had been taken 
into consideration. 
 
 “We had received several comment letters from industry regarding their 
views and issues about convergence …we had taken those issues into 
consideration during discussions” 
 
This relationship is likely to be significant because Japan is currently India’s 3rd 
largest source of foreign direct investment. Also India is the largest recipient of  
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Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan. Hence Japan has been 
providing financial assistance to India for infrastructure development projects such 
as the Delhi Metro Rail Project (DMRC Report, 2014). Discussing the significance 
of India’s ties with Japan, a member of the MCA stated, 
 
      “We have a longstanding and strong relationship with Japan…..not just 
on issues of convergence…more important spheres of trade, technology and 
economic relations” (MCA 3). 
 
In this case, the state and industry both included actors operating in trade and 
economic institutional fields in different capacities. For example, institutional state 
actors as well as private sector industry representatives such as the MCA were 
involved in maintaining decades of trading and donor-recipient relations with state 
actors of Japan through projects such as DMRC (DMRC Report, 2014).  These 
actors belonging to different institutional fields bring with them different priorities 
and ideas. Thus the India-Japan IFRS dialogue is a clear example of state driven 
networks between transnational institutional fields that influenced the decision-
making process in India. 
 
However, the impact of this network was different from that of other transnational 
influences. Influences from all transnational institutional fields so far had most 
definitely been in favour of immediate IFRS convergence (MCA Press Note, 2009). 
Although there was no official evidence to prove this at the time, a senior member 
of the MCA revealed that the Japanese delegation was not very keen on immediate 
convergence, 
 
“… their opinions were slightly different from ours…they suggested 
2017 for convergence which at the time we thought was quite late…. they 
were not in favour of immediate convergence” (MCA1). 
 
The reason suggested for this unofficial stance of Japan, by the MCA representative 
was the delay in US’s decision for IFRS convergence. While the formal position of 
the Japanese delegation had been to engage in resolving convergence issues the 
informal, and it would seem, its genuine position has been to delay convergence in 
response to US delays: 
 
During the formal meetings we had, the official policy of both sides focussed 
on immediate convergence …we realised during informal discussions at 
dinners and social events that they were not very keen on immediate 
convergence (MCA 1). 
 
 
Since US and Japan were significant trade partners (Business Accounting Council 
Report, 2013), the latter was in no hurry to go ahead with convergence in a situation 
where the US had not yet made a final decision. 
 
This information provided by the interviewee was validated by some key events 
that marked the decision-making process for convergence in Japan. In 2009, a key 
standard-setting body of Japan, the Business Accounting Council (BAC), issued a 
report that allowed voluntary adoption of IFRS by listed companies starting in 
March 2010. The report also stated that the decision for mandatory adoption would 
be finalised by the end of 2012 (BAC Report, 2009). In June 2011, however, the 
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Minister of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) made an announcement of 
indefinitely postponing the decision on mandatory IFRS adoption citing reasons 
such as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) postponement of IFRS 
adoption in US, representations from Japanese industrial and trade union lobbies to 
postpone convergence, divergent factors in Japan’s economic and legal institutional 
fields and finally natural disasters such as Tsunami that had hit the country 
(Tsunogaya, 2016). 
 
Tsunogaya (2016, pp. 831) notes the significance of the influence of US delays on 
BAC stating that, 
 
“The BAC’s policies have been largely influenced by the US-SEC 
decisions, which postponed the adoption of IFRS in the USA (see 
Securities and Exchange Commission. Uncertainty remains about 
whether or not the USA will ultimately mandate adoption of IFRS”. 
 
The author further states that the decision to postpone mandatory IFRS adoption in 
Japan was despite pressures on the BAC from the IFRS Foundation to speed up 
adoption as well as make financial contributions in order to maintain their position 
as a member of the monitoring board of IFRS Foundation. On the other hand, the 
study states that it is such pressure from the IFRS Foundations that “allowed” the 
BAC to announce voluntary adoption of IFRS in the country. This suggests that the 
BAC was trying to maintain a power balance between demands of actors from and 
global institutional fields while making decisions towards IFRS convergence. 
 
Such evidence from the Japanese decision-making arena demonstrates the wider 
applicability of the debates and discussions constituting the decision-making 
process in India. First of all, it suggests that influences from transnational 
institutional fields could also have been partly responsible for delaying or 
supporting those who wanted to delay the IFRS convergence process, not only in 
India but also in other countries going through similar decision-making processes. 
Secondly, the actions of the BAC, a key decision-maker in the Japanese 
convergence process when analysed through the lens of resource dependency 
dynamics used in this study, reflects the power balancing acts employed by the state 
as a key decision-maker for convergence in India. Thirdly it represents the flow of 
influences between decision-making arenas of different nation states. This point is 
elucidated through further discussion of the ideas that were transferred and 
exchanged between these arenas through resource dependency relations. 
 
A common and key feature that formed a part of the resource dependency dynamics 
in the decision-making processes for convergence in both India and Japan is the 
significant impact of US’s decision to delay convergence. In seeking to understand 
whether Japan’s stance to delay convergence had an influence on India’s decision, 
this study relied on information provided by interviewees who were senior 
government officials directly participating in the decision-making process. For 
example, one interviewee stated off the record, 
 
Of course we have given this (Japan’s preference to delay convergence) 
significant consideration ....it also contributed to our decision-making process…. 
the reason we’re conducting these joint IFRS dialogues is so that we can share 
ideas and strategies on the IFRS convergence decision (MCA 2).  
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A senior member of the ICAI also concurred stating that, 
 
Yes of course, we do refer to convergence processes in other 
countries…although this may not always be stated in official statements 
issued…in the case of Japan, the very purpose of holding these joint meetings is 
to collaborate to formulate strategies of IFRS convergence (PB 5). 
 
The information provided by the interviewee was validated by actual delays that 
continued to occur in the decision-making process. 
 
In addition to this, US was indicated as one of the sources of reference in the initial 
stages of the decision-making process. For example, the ICAI in its concept paper 
states that, 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) of USA and IASB are also 
working towards the convergence of the US GAAPs and the IFRSs. The 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) has mooted a proposal to permit 
filing of IFRS-compliant financial statements without requiring presentation of 
a reconciliation statement between US GAAPs and IFRSs in near future. In this 
scenario, India being an important emerging economy in the World, is yet to 
adopt the IFRSs (ICAI Concept Paper, 2007). 
 
Subsequently the delays in the IFRS convergence decision in India 
coincided with delays in the convergence decision in the US. Also, the 
Indian decision-making arena had a small segment of actors who 
independently and informally followed the US decision-making process 
and were convinced that the best strategy would be to wait till the US 
makes a decision on convergence. These opinions, however, were 
unofficial and informal. For example, an interviewee from the 
government stated, 
 
“If IFRS is so good, why isn’t the US adopting it? It’s been so many years …I 
am an accountant myself and my personal opinion is that US GAAP is much 
better and unambiguous in comparison to IFRS and that’s the reason why US 
has not adopted IFRS… let us wait to see what the US does ...although we are 
not officially obliged to follow the US” (MCA 2). 
 
The diffusion of influences across multiple transnational and national institutional 
fields to give shape to convergence decisions is clearly demonstrated through such 
evidence. Such actors included representatives of the state, professional bodies and 
industry. Some of the reasons and rationales presented by these actors and their 
influences on the decision-making process are discussed below. 
 
Significance of US Delays on the Decision-Making Process in India 
 
Dependence on the US economy has been quoted by a few members of the Indian 
industry and the MCA as a reason for India’s reluctance to go ahead with the 
convergence process. According to one individual member of the industry, 
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“…a significant percentage of Indian economy is dependent on US 
economy in terms of fund raising or customisation etc. maximum amount 
of private equity and FDI is received from the US economy via Mauritius 
or Cyprus route but the original source is the US economy” (IB 4). 
 
Further explaining the situation, the interviewee states that India would not like a 
situation where it had implemented IFRS and the US did not converge with IFRS. 
Noting that US GAAP is very investor friendly, the interviewee also stated that, 
 
“All big 50 companies in India are following US GAAP…they are 
preparing a second set of financial statements…” (IB 4). 
 
Two different views of MCA representatives on this issue were interpreted from 
interviews. According to one view, there are several others also within the 
government sphere who hold his point of view that US GAAP is far more advanced 
and unambiguous in comparison to IFRS. 
 
“Many people in the government also have the view that US GAAP is 
better...it is advanced and unambiguous unlike IFRS which is 
complicated and most people do not understand IFRS here…if IFRS is so 
advanced and efficient, then why is the US delaying convergence…” 
(MCA3). 
Another view of MCA representatives on direct or indirect influences from US is 
outright denial of any such influence. For example, one representative of the MCA 
stated, 
 
We are not obliged to follow Japan or US…as the government of India we 
make independent decisions....we are not influenced by industry either…we 
take their views into consideration but they cannot influence us (MCA3). 
 
However, interviewees from industry and professional accounting bodies did 
acknowledge that India is indeed influenced by decisions of significant and 
economically powerful trading partners. One member of industry stated, 
 
The government would always claim to be entirely independent of any 
influences …however, it is impossible to believe such a thing in this era…no 
country makes decisions in isolation…for example, why doesn’t Indian 
government hold convergence talks with Bhutan? Why Japan...Japan is more 
important to us in terms of trade etc. (IB5) 
 
 
Hence, IFRS dialogues with Japan was a channel that conveyed indirect influences 
of US delays into India. For example, the SEC’s delay in decision- making was 
identified as a key factor in Japan’s decision to delay adopting IFRS and, by 
extension, it also impacted India’s decision to delay convergence. This sequence of 
events can be interpreted as shown in Figure 2 as an instance where influence flows 
from the transnational to the regional and then to the local decision-making arena. 
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The arrows passing through the three regions indicate the flow of institutional influences from 
the US through Japan to the Indian decision-making arena for IFRS convergence. In addition, the 
flow of institutional influences between regulatory institutional fields in the US and India could 
also be interpreted as two- way. At a national conference of the American Institute of CPAs 
(AICPA) in 2010, while discussing the US approach to integrating IFRS with US GAAP, SEC’s 
Deputy Chief Accountant, Paul Beswick stated, 
 
 
To give you an example, India is set to move to IFRS in 2011. However, they 
describe their approach as a convergence approach to IFRS and have indicated 
that they may not fully adopt IFRS if they believe an exception is warranted… 
the majority of jurisdictions are either following a convergence or endorsement 
approach. If the US were to move to IFRS, I will call it a ‘condorsement’ 
approach. (Whitehouse, 2011) 
 
 
This statement demonstrates how the decision of the US on IFRS convergence was being informed 
by the experience of convergence projects in other countries, including India. Such examples of 
transnational references in the context of national decision-making of different countries further 
emphasises the exchange of influences between global, regional and local institutional fields. 
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The evidence from the India-Japan IFRS dialogue and the opinions of government representatives 
quoted above suggest that delays in the IFRS convergence decision-making process in the US have 
influenced the decision-making process in India in a dual manner. Firstly, through dependence of 
domestic institutional fields on trade and economic institutional fields in Japan and secondly 
through the alliance of institutional fields within the Indian and US economies. In both contexts, 
the US acts as a significant source of indirect and direct influence. Analysing the nature of the 
relationships between these institutional fields indicates that exchange of resources is an important 
aspect defining the relationship and hence acting as the cause of flow of influence. The 
relationships between the actors and their medium of influences will be discussed in detail in the 
next section. Hence these were some influences from the transnational institutional sphere that 
indirectly provided support to the rising local resistance to the convergence process in India. 
 
5.3 Resource Dependencies between National and Transnational 
Institutional Fields: Role of State as the Key Decision-Maker 
 
Since the state is the key official decision-maker in the convergence decision, a brief analysis of 
the nature of relationships between the state and few main actors in the decision-making arena is 
presented below: 
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Figure 3 shows the resource dependencies between transnational and local 
institutional fields of the network that drove the convergence decision-making 
process in India, focusing on the state as the official decision-maker. 
While discussing the state’s resource exchange relations with industry, 
interviewees stated that corporates provide political support to the ruling party as 
well as other political parties. As a member from industry stated, 
 
Of course, there are links between government and industry…..our industry 
is powerful now unlike pre-liberalisation era when government could dictate 
everything…corporates provide large amounts of funds for election 
campaigns….and they certainly don’t do that for charity… (IB4). 
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As shown in Figure 2, the Indian government has resource exchange relationships 
with professional bodies, industrial lobbies and the Japanese delegation and it holds 
a resource dependency relationship with IFIs in the decision-making arena. In each 
case the resources are different. In the first case, the government provides 
legitimacy and authority to the ICAI and the ICAI provides technical support and 
knowledge regarding standard-setting. The ICAI, although autonomous to a great 
extent, still exists under the supervision of the central government. The standards 
issued by the ICAI become mandatory only when authorised and announced by the 
government. In 1999 the GOI constituted the NACAS, an advisory body on 
accounting standards under the Companies (Amendment) Act 1999 (Das and 
Pramanik, 2009; MCA Press Note, 2009). NACAS is also composed of members 
from professional bodies such as the ICAI. The ICAI’s resistance to full adoption 
of IFRS due to legal and economic factors in India is also interpreted to be an 
internal institutional response that acted as a significant channel of technical and 
regulatory resistance at the local level. Between the government and IFIs, there 
exists a clear case of resource dependency – both financial and technical. The State 
Financial Accountability Assessment (SFAA) reports prepared by the WB and 
addressed to various provincial governments could be cited as an example of inflow 
of technical resource from IFIs (SFAA Report 2004; World Bank Report, 2004; 
World Bank Report, 2017). 
 
However, as illustrated in figure 2, the resource dependency relations of the state 
with other actors from both local and transnational regional institutional fields tone 
down or dilute the intensity of IFI’s influence over the decision-making process. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
This study has found that India’s move towards convergence involved power- 
balancing flows of significant influences from actors embedded in multiple 
institutional fields in the decision-making arena rather than being solely influenced 
by IFI’s, as was observed in the convergence process of Bangladesh (Mir & 
Rahman, 2005). 
 
The India-Japan IFRS dialogue was an important transnational network in the 
decision-making process for India. This transnational influence was different from 
others as it supported resistance to immediate convergence at the local level due to 
Japan’s unofficial stance to delay convergence. Nevertheless, despite this 
preference for delay being well known to India, or possibly because of it, the official 
Indian view was that Indo-Japan dialogue was perceived as being an effort to speed 
up the convergence decision. The political institutional fields of Indian and Japan 
could also be viewed as having a resource exchange/dependency relationship 
because of the ODA recipient status of India with Japan. The India- Japan IFRS 
dialogue can be viewed as a forum of technical knowledge sharing. In addition to 
the donor-recipient relations between Japan and India, significant trade relations 
between Japan and US and the international operations of major Indian industries 
also acted as sources of influence; as also did the SEC’s decision to delay IFRS 
convergence. The outcome of these influences was that, as discussed earlier, all 
major Indian companies have been preparing financial reports according to US 
GAAP, in addition to the reports based on the previous Indian accounting standards. 
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Figures 2 and 3 presented in Section 5 show that the flow of institutional influence 
is determined by subtle power dynamics that are balanced on the resource 
dependence or exchange relations between actors in the decision-making arena. 
There is a power imbalance amongst actors in the arena that results in the flow of 
influence (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). The theoretical constructs of power 
imbalance arising due to resources such as knowledge (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007) 
and mutual dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005) lead to the inference that 
power imbalance in this context is determined by the mutual dependence of actors. 
Mutual dependence in the convergence decision translates into resource exchanges 
and resource dependence between global, regional and national actors. 
 
The type and nature of dependence or exchange of resources in an institutional field 
could place one actor in a relatively more powerful position than the other 
(Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Chua & Taylor, 2008). For instance, the power balance 
between the state on one hand and on the other hand actors such as industries and 
Japan seems to be heavily tilted towards the latter due to substantial resource 
dependence relationship with both Japan and industries. However, it should be 
noted that while Japan has been quite forthright in citing US delays as one of the 
factors influencing the Japanese convergence decision, the official stance of the 
Indian government has been to insist that the convergence decision is independent 
of such influences. These findings demonstrate the manner in which socio-political 
and economic factors play a role in convergence decisions (Chua & Taylor, 2008). 
 
Despite claims of independent decision-making by the state, the power equation 
between the political and economic institutional fields within the country 
(Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Chua & Taylor, 2008), for example, could be inferred 
from newspaper articles on heavy funding of political campaigns by powerful 
corporate houses. This was also demonstrated by the change in the stance of the 
state over time. While the state was initially keen to go ahead with convergence 
ideas initiated by IFIs and other global forums, the entry of industry and Japanese 
delegation into the decision-making arena as well as ICAI’s resistance to certain 
IFRS due to legal and economic conditions in India, seemed to have altered the 
stance of the state. Influences from the trade and economic institutional fields of 
the US that managed to permeate into the decision-making processes through 
indirect mediums partly contributed to the repeated delays in the convergence 
process. 
 
Analysing these relationships in terms of resource dependencies/ exchanges 
between national and transnational institutional fields provides a better explanation 
for the power dynamics observed in the global policy networks that constitute the 
decision-making arena. The resource exchanges and dependencies presented in 
Figure 2 could be interpreted as the sources that provide an influential position to 
certain actors and place others in a position to be influenced. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Extant literature on global accounting convergence rarely examines the decision- 
making process for accounting standards convergence as being influenced by 
traditional cross-country economic relationships. This study contributes to the 
literature by emphasising the importance of nation states in the transnational 
accounting regulation arena by portraying the decision making process as being 
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significantly influenced by the convergence decisions made by other nation states 
which are traditional economic and trade partners. Different types of resource 
dependency relations between the actors embedded in multiple institutional fields 
of the transnational policy network driving the decision-making process play a key 
role in shaping the decision-making process. An example of such key influences on 
the decision -making in India was the impact of US delays on the decision to 
converge with IFRS. This demonstrates that while powerful transnational 
organisations actively promote convergence, nation states play a key role in 
counter-balancing the effects of such promotion. This is achieved by exchange of 
influences through traditional trade and economic ties between nation states as well 
as successfully countering pressure from transnational bodies promoting full 
convergence. Local resistance to such pressure was channelled through industrial 
lobbying as well as ICAI’s stance on the need to create carve- outs for certain IFRS 
to suit the legal and economic environment in the country. India’s ties with other 
nation states such as US and Japan on the convergence decision-making process 
highlights the significant roles of cross-governmental relationships within the 
global accounting regulation arena and also questions the portrayal of transnational 
organisations as unchallenged powers in such regulatory spaces. 
 
This study provides an analytical framework that could be adapted to investigate 
the convergence decision-making process of other countries. It identifies the flow 
of transnational and national influences in the context of resource dependencies 
and ensuing power imbalances between actors in the decision-making arena. The 
framework facilitates the narration of the convergence decision as a story that 
rationalises the links between global and local actors that actually drive the 
decision-making process. Analysing the resource dependency/ exchange 
relations through trade and economic alliances between these actors help to 
understand underlying power imbalances. This demonstrates that power 
equations between actors significantly shape the decision-making process. It 
helps to present the evidence for the initiation and growth of the decision-making 
process as constituted of meaningful and logically consequential 
communications and developments rather than isolated and random events. In 
this context the study provides an analytical platform which could facilitate 
further investigation of convergence as a process. 
 
The study makes the following contributions to accounting policy, practice and 
academia. Firstly, it provides insights into the deliberations and negotiations 
between state and non-state policy makers at both transnational and national 
levels. It demonstrates why and how accounting policy choices are determined by 
key policy-makers, specifically focusing on the significance of geo-political 
alliances in driving such decisions in the context of a developing country. The 
findings of the study contribute to literature that challenges the notion of a 
‘harmonised’ set of accounting standards leading to convergence of accounting 
practices by unraveling the disparities in rhetoric and reasons for convergence 
provided by key decision-makers.  Secondly, it illustrates the evolution of 
national accounting practices in a country driven by efforts to converge national 
accounting standards with IFRS. It traces institutional influences of legislative, 
economic and geo-political dynamics on national accounting practices and 
demonstrates how such influences shape decisions that determine accounting 
practices in a developing country.  
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Finally, the study makes a significant contribution to extant literature by delving 
deep into the decision-making process for convergence specifically focusing on 
the role of transnational trade and economic alliances between nation-states vis-
à-vis the role of powerful transnational organisations such as IFIs which are 
traditionally perceived as all pervasive powerful influencers in accounting 
convergence decisions. The study also questions the plausibility of achieving 
accounting standards ‘harmonization’, let alone harmonization of accounting 
practices, as intended by the IASB given the diverse agendas of decision-makers 
operating from multiple institutional fields. 
 
In terms of future scope for research, investigating convergence with international 
accounting standards as an extension and consequence of the decision-making 
process would provide a fuller and more comprehensive picture of the 
convergence process. The findings of studies that examine the hurdles to 
implementation and compliance issues could be further investigated in the light 
of the events that took place before the decision was made and as a continuation 
of those events. It would be interesting and informative to explore the networks 
and people involved at the post implementation stage and the manner in which 
their presence or absence plays a role in the development and execution of the 
implementation process. 
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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW DETAILS 
 
 
* Core Group (CG) – group constituted of key national decision-makers 
* Ministry of Corporate Affairs – MCA 
* Ministry of Finance – MoF 
* Professional Body – PB – Members of Accounting Body 
*Industrial Body – Members of Industrial associations and corporate entities. 
 
*World Bank – WB 
 
 
Interviewee 
Code 
Position Type of 
interview 
Location Date Length of 
Interviews 
1. CG 1 Member of 
Core Group* 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 25 
minutes 
2.CG 2 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 
3.CG 3 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 10 
minutes 
4.CG4 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
May 
2014 
1 hour 
5.CG5 Member of 
Core Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
6.MCA1 Member of 
MCA 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
50 minutes 
7.MCA2 Member of 
MCA 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 
8.MCA3 Member of 
MCA 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 
9.MOF1 Member of 
MOF 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
55 minutes 
10.MOF2 Member of 
MOF 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
50 minutes 
11.MOF3 Member of 
MOF 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
45 minutes 
12.PB1 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
13.PB2 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 20 
minutes 
14.PB3 Accounting Face to face Tamil July 1 hour 30 
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 body 
Member 
& Skype Nadu 2012 minutes 
15.PB4 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
 2 hours 
16.PB5 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Face to face 
Skype 
New 
Delhi 
July 
2012, 
May 
2014, 
May 
2015 
3 hours 30 
minutes 
17.PB6 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Telephone New 
Delhi 
 1 hour 
18.PB7 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Telephone Kerala, 
India 
May 
2012 
2 hours 
19.PB8 Accounting 
body 
Member 
Telephone New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 
20.IB 1 Member of 
Industrial 
Association 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
2 hours 
21.IB2 Member of 
Industrial 
Association 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
2 hours 
22.IB 3 Member of 
Industrial 
Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
April 
2013 
1 hour 
23.IB 4 Member of 
Industrial 
Group 
Face to face New 
Delhi 
July 
2012 
1 hour 30 
minutes 
24.IB 5 Member of 
Industrial 
Group 
Face to face 
& 
Telephone 
New 
Delhi 
July 
2012, 
May 
2013 
2 hours 30 
minutes 
25. WB1 Member of 
WB 
Telephone New 
Delhi 
January 
2013 
1 hour 
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APPENDIX 2 – CLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS ANALYSED 
 
 
 
 
Documents Issued by Examples of Documents 
 
Government 
 
Reports, Press Releases, Press Notes, General Notifications 
 
Professional Bodies 
 
Reports, President’s Annual Message, Commentary 
letters, Exposure drafts, website material 
Public practice 
accountancy firms 
 
Reports by KPMG, PWC, Deloitte 
 
Regulatory Bodies 
 
Reports by SEBI, ESMA, website materials 
 
Professional and 
Business Media 
outlets 
 
The Business Standard 
The Hindu 
The Business Line 
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